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Abstract
A central feature in the Copenhagen interpretation is the use of
classical concepts from the outset. Modern developments show, how-
ever, that the emergence of classical properties can be understood
within the framework of quantum theory itself, through the process of
decoherence. This fact becomes most crucial for the interpretability of
quantum cosmology – the application of quantum theory to the Uni-
verse as a whole. I briefly review these developments and emphasize
the importance of an unbiased attitude on the interpretational side
for future progress in physics.
Ich bin nicht damit zufrieden, wenn man eine Maschinerie hat,
die zwar zu prophezeien gestattet, der wir aber keinen klaren Sinn
zu geben vermo¨gen.
Albert Einstein in a letter to Max Born (3.12.1953)
1 Copenhagen interpretations and alternatives
A physical theory contains both a mathematical formalism and an interpre-
tational scheme. Although their relation may be subtle already for classical
physics, it becomes highly non-trivial in quantum theory. In fact, although
the mathematical framework had been basically fixed by 1932, the debate
about its meaning is going on. As we shall see, this is due to the possibility of
having conflicting concepts of reality, without contradicting the formalism.
This is why all physicists agree on the practical application of the formalism
to concrete problems such as the calculation of transition probabilities.
It is often asserted that the orthodox view is given by the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory. This is the standpoint taken by most
textbooks. What is this interpretation? It is generally assumed that it
originated from intense discussions between Bohr, Heisenberg, and others in
Copenhagen in the years 1925-27. However, there has never been complete
agreement about the actual meaning, or even definition, of this interpreta-
tion even among its main contributors. In fact, the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion has remained until today an amalgamation of different views. As has
been convincingly argued in [1], it is the incompatibility between Bohr’s and
Heisenberg’s views that sometimes gives the impression of inconsistencies in
the Copenhagen interpretation.
Historically, Heisenberg wanted to base quantum theory solely on ob-
servable quantities such as the intensity of spectral lines, getting rid of all
intuitive (anschauliche) concepts such as particle trajectories in space-time
[2]. This attitude changed drastically with his paper [3] in which he intro-
duced the uncertainty relations – there he put forward the point of view
that it is the theory which decides what can be observed. His move from
positivism to operationalism can be clearly understood as a reaction on the
advent of Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics [1] which, in particular due to its
intuitiveness, became soon very popular among physicists. In fact, the word
anschaulich (intuitive) is contained in the title of Heisenberg’s paper [3].
Bohr, on the other hand, gave the first summary of his interpretation
in his famous lecture delivered in Como in September 1927, cf. [4]. There
he introduced the notion of complementarity between particles and waves –
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according to von Weizsa¨cker the core of the Copenhagen interpretation [5].
As is well known, he later extended complementarity to non-physical themes
and advanced it to a central concept of his own philosophy. Complemen-
tarity means that quantum objects are neither particles nor waves; for our
intuition we have to use both pictures, in which the range of applicability
of one picture necessarily constrains the range of applicability of the other.
Heisenberg, as a mathematical physicist, was not at ease with such an in-
terpretation. He preferred to use one coherent set of concepts, rather than
two imcompatible ones, cf. [1]. In fact, it was known by then that particle
and wave language can be converted into each other and are transcended
into the consistent formalism of quantum theory. As Heisenberg wrote in
his book [6]: “Licht und Materie sind einheitliche physikalische Pha¨nomene,
ihre scheinbare Doppelnatur liegt an der wesentlichen Unzula¨nglichkeit un-
serer Sprache. . . .Will man trotzdem von der Mathematik zur anschaulichen
Beschreibung der Vorga¨nge u¨bergehen, so muß man sich mit unvollsta¨ndigen
Analogien begnu¨gen, wie sie uns Wellen- und Partikelbild bieten1.”
Even Bohr’s own interpretation did change in the course of time. This
happened in particular due to the influence of the important paper by Ein-
stein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935 (EPR) [7]. Before EPR, an essential
ingredient of his interpretation was the uncontrollable disturbance of the
quantum system by the apparatus during a measurement. The analysis of
EPR demonstrated, however, that the issue is not the disturbance, but the
non-separability (the entanglement) of a quantum system over in principle
unlimited spatial distances. Therefore, in his response to EPR [8], Bohr
adopted a strong operationalistic attitude, concealing the crucial concept of
entanglement. Taking the indispensability of classical concepts for granted,
he argued that even without any mechanical disturbance there is an “influ-
ence of the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions
regarding the future behavior of the system” [8], i.e. no simultaneous reality
for measurements of noncommuting variables such as position and momen-
tum should exist. This attitude leads eventually to the consequence that
quantum systems would not possess a real existence before interacting with
a suitable measurement device (“only an observed phenomenon is a phe-
nomenon”).
A somewhat ambigous role in the Copenhagen interpretation(s) is played
by the “collapse” or “reduction” of the wave function. This was introduced
by Heisenberg in his uncertainty paper [3] and later postulated by von Neu-
1“Light and matter are unique physical phenomena, their apparent double nature is
due to the essential inadequacy of our language. . . . If one nevertheless wants to procede
from the mathematics to the intuitive description of the phenomena, we have to restrict
ourselves to incomplete analogies as they are offered by the wave and particle pictures.”
2
mann as a dynamical process independent of the Schro¨dinger equation, see
Sec. 2. Most proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation have considered
this reduction as a mere increase of knowledge (a transition from the potential
to the actual), therefore denying that the wave function is a kinematical con-
cept and thus affected by dynamics. The assumption of a dynamical collapse
would definitely be in conflict with Bohr’s ideas of complementarity which
forbid a physical analysis of the measurement process. To summarise, one can
identify the following ingredients as being characteristic for the Copenhagen
interpretation(s):
• Indispensability of classical concepts for the description of the measure-
ment process
• Complementarity between particles and waves
• Reduction of the wave packet as a formal rule without dynamical sig-
nificance
This set of rules has been sufficient to apply the quantum formalism pragmat-
ically to concrete problems. But is it still sufficient? And is it satisfactory?
Modern developments heavily rely on the concept of entanglement, in or-
der to describe satisfactorily the precision experiments that are now being
performed in quantum optics and other fields. From the experimental viola-
tion of Bell’s inequalities it has become evident, that quantum theory cannot
be substituted by a theory referring to a local reality. This is of course a
consequence of the superposition principle – the heart of quantum theory.
Among recent developments employing entanglement are quantum compu-
tation and quantum cryptography [9] and the reversible transition from the
(coherent) superfluid phase to an (incoherent) Mott insulator phase in a
Bose-Einstein condensate [10], during which interference patterns appear and
disappear. The superposition principle is indispensable for describing K−K¯
and neutrino oscillations. It would be hard to imagine how all this can be
understood by denying any dynamical nature of the wave function and to
interpret it as describing mere knowledge. Moreover, it is now clear, both
theoretically and experimentally, that the classical appearance of our world
can be understood as a dynamical process within quantum theory itself, with-
out any need to postulate it. Therein, entanglement plays the crucial role.
This will be discussed in the next section.
There have been, in the course of history, various attempts to come up
with an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation [11, 12]. Here I want
to mention two of them, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation and the Ev-
erett interpretation. Many other interpretations are some variant or mixture
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of these two and the Copenhagen interpretation. The consistent-histories
interpretation, for example, contains elements from both Copenhagen and
Everett, see e.g. Chap. 5 in [13]. Different from these interpretations are at-
tempts which aim at an explicit change of the Schro¨dinger equation in order
to get a dynamical collapse of the wave function, see e.g. Chap. 8 in [13]. Up
to now, however, there is no experimental hint that the Schro¨dinger equation
has to be modified.
In the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation (or “theory”), the wave function
Ψ is supplemented with classical variables (particles and fields) possessing
definitive values of position and momentum. Whereas the wave function
obeys an autonomous dynamics (obeying the Schro¨dinger equation with-
out additional collapse), the particle dynamics depends on Ψ (often called
a guiding field). Assuming that the particles are distributed according to
|Ψ|2, the predictions of this theory are indistinguishable from the ordinary
framework, at least within non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After a mea-
surement, the particle is trapped within one particular wave packet with the
usual quantum-mechanical probability. Because the other wave packets are
spatially separated from it after the measurement, they can no longer influ-
ence the particle. This represents an apparent collapse of the wave function
and the occurrence of a definite measurement result. In principle, however,
the remaining packets, although empty, can interfere again with the packet
containing the particle, but the probability for this is tiny in macroscopic
situations.
John Bell called the Everett interpretation a Bohm interpretation without
trajectories. In fact, Everett assumes just as Bohm that the wave function
is part of reality and that there is never any collapse. Therefore, after a
measurement, all components corresponding to the different outcomes are
equally present. It is claimed that the probability interpretation of quantum
theory can be derived from the formalism (which is, however, a contentious
issue). Von Weizsa¨cker calls this interpretation [5] “. . . die einzige, die nicht
hinter das schon von der Quantentheorie erreichte Versta¨ndnis zuru¨ck-, son-
dern vorwa¨rts u¨ber es hinausstrebt2.” The open question is of course when
and how these different components (“branches”) become independent of
each other. This leads me to the central topic – the emergence of classical
behaviour in quantum theory.
2“. . . the only one that does not fall back behind the understanding already achieved
by quantum theory but which strives forwards and even beyond.”
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2 The emergence of classical properties in quan-
tum theory
If classical concepts are not imposed from the outset, they have to be derived
from the formalism, at least in an approximate sense. John von Neumann
was the first who analysed in 1932 the measurement process within quantum
mechanics. He considers the coupling of a system (S) to an apparatus (A),
see Fig. 1.
S A✲
Figure 1: Original form of the von Neumann measurement model.
Let the states of the measured system which are discriminated by the
apparatus be denoted by |n〉 (for example, spin up and spin down), then an
appropriate interaction Hamiltonian has the form (see Chap. 3 in [13], or
[14])
Hint =
∑
n
|n〉〈n| ⊗ Aˆn . (1)
The operators Aˆn, acting on the states of the apparatus, are rather arbitrary,
but must of course depend on the “quantum number” n. Eq. (1) describes
an “ideal” interaction during which the apparatus becomes correlated with
the system state, without changing the latter. There is thus no disturbance
of the system by the apparatus – on the contrary, the apparatus is disturbed
by the system (in order to yield a measurement result).
If the measured system is initially in the state |n〉 and the device in some
initial state |Φ0〉, the evolution according to the Schro¨dinger equation with
Hamiltonian (1) reads
|n〉|Φ0〉
t
−→ exp (−iHintt) |n〉|Φ0〉 = |n〉 exp
(
−iAˆnt
)
|Φ0〉
=: |n〉|Φn(t)〉 . (2)
The resulting apparatus states |Φn(t)〉 are often called “pointer states”. A
process analogous to (2) can also be formulated in classical physics. The
essential new quantum features now come into play when we consider a su-
perposition of different eigenstates (of the measured “observable”) as initial
state. The linearity of time evolution immediately leads to(∑
n
cn|n〉
)
|Φ0〉
t
−→
∑
n
cn|n〉|Φn(t)〉 . (3)
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But this state is a superposition of macroscopic measurement results (of
which Schro¨dinger’s cat is just one drastic example)! To avoid such a bizarre
state, and to avoid the apparent conflict with experience, von Neumann
introduced the dynamical collapse of the wave function as a new law. The
collapse should then select one component with the probability |cn|
2. He
even envisaged that the collapse is eventually caused by the consciousness of
a human observer, an interpretation that was later also adopted by Wigner.
In the Everett interpretation, all the branches (each component in (3)) are
assumed to co-exist simultaneously.
Can von Neumann’s conclusion and the introduction of the collapse be
avoided? The crucial observation [15], which enforces an extension of von
Neumann’s measurement theory, is the fact that macroscopic objects (such as
measurement devices) are so strongly coupled to their natural environment,
that a unitary treatment as in (2) is by no means sufficient and has to be
modified to include the environment.
S A✲ E✲✲
✲
Figure 2: Realistic extension of the von Neumann measurement model includ-
ing the environment. Classical properties emerge through the unavoidable,
irreversible interaction of the apparatus with the environment.
Fortunately, this can easily be done to a good approximation, since the
interaction with the environment has in many situations the same form as
given by the Hamiltonian (1): The measurement device is itself “measured”
(passively recognised) by the environment, according to(∑
n
cn|n〉|Φn〉
)
|E0〉
t
−→
∑
n
cn|n〉|Φn〉|En〉. (4)
This is again a macroscopic superposition, now including the myriads of
degrees of freedom pertaining to the environment (gas molecules, photons,
etc.). However, most of these environmental degrees of freedom are inac-
cessible. Therefore, they have to be integrated out from the full state (4).
This leads to the reduced density matrix for system plus apparatus, which
contains all the information that is available there. It reads
ρSA ≈
∑
n
|cn|
2|n〉〈n| ⊗ |Φn〉〈Φn| if 〈En|Em〉 ≈ δnm , (5)
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since under realistic conditions, different environmental states are orthogonal
to each other. Eq. (5) is identical to the density matrix of an ensemble of
measurement results |n〉|Φn〉. System and apparatus thus seem to be in one
of the states |n〉 and |Φn〉, given by the probability |cn|
2.
Both system and apparatus thus assume classical properties through the
unavoidable, irreversible interaction with the environment. This dynamical
process, which is fully described by quantum theory, is called decoherence
[13]. It is based on the quantum entanglement between apparatus and envi-
ronment. Under ordinary macroscopic situations, decoherence occurs on an
extremely short timescale, giving the impression of an instantaneous collapse
or a “quantum jump”. Recent experiments were able to demonstrate the
continuous emergence of classical properties in mesoscopic systems [16, 17].
Therefore, one would never ever be able to observe a weird superposition
such as Schro¨dinger’s cat, because the information about this superposition
would almost instantaneously be delocalised into unobservable correlations
with the environment, resulting in an apparent collapse for the cat state. The
concept of decoherence motivated Wigner to give up his explanation of the
collapse as being caused by consciousness [18]. In fact, decoherence makes it
evident that living creatures play no particular role in the interpretation of
quantum theory.
The interaction with the environment distinguishes the local basis with
respect to which classical properties (unobservability of interferences) hold.
This “pointer basis” must obey the condition of robustness, i.e. it must
keep its classical appearance over the relevant timescales [19, 20]. Classical
properties are thus not intrinsic to any object, but only defined by their
interaction with other degrees of freedom. In simple (Markovian) situations
the pointer states are given by localised Gaussian states [21]. They are, in
particular, relevant for the localisation of macroscopic objects.
To summarise, these developments have shown that classical concepts
are not an indispensable input to the theory, as required by the Copenhagen
interpretation, but a natural consequence of the theory itself when applied
to realistic conditions.
3 Quantum gravity
The modern developments discussed in the last section show that the main
assumptions of the Copenhagen interpretation, such as complementarity and
the demand for a priori classical concepts, are not obligatory. Still, one
might argue, it could be possible to adopt this interpretation as a convenient
background for pragmatic use.
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While this may be true for ordinary laboratory situations, it may become
impossible if quantum effects of the gravitational field are involved. It must
be admitted that no effects of quantum gravity have yet been seen, or iden-
tified as such, and that no final consensus about such a theory has emerged.
However, there exist many models with important applications in cosmology;
without an appropriate and consistent interpretation, such models would be
void of interest.
In ordinary quantum theory, time is given as an external parameter and
not subject to quantisation. On the other hand, the gravitational field is
described by Einstein’s theory of general relativity, in which space and time
are dynamical and not absolute. I have discussed elsewhere the reasons why
one generally believes that gravity must be described by a quantum theory
at the most fundamental level [22]. If one quantises a theory that classically
possesses no absolute time – be it general relativity or some alternative theory
– the ensuing quantum theory does not contain any time parameter at all.
Since the role of time in general relativity is merely to parametrise spacetimes
(the “trajectories” in the corresponding configuration space), the absence of
time in quantum gravity is the consequence of the absence of trajectories in
quantum theory. The central equation of quantum gravity is of the general
form
HˆΨ = 0 , (6)
where Hˆ is the total Hamilton operator of both gravitational and non-
gravitational fields. The total quantum state is thus of a stationary form.
Since quantum degrees of freedom are very sensitive to their environment (see
Sec. 2), and since the dominant interaction in the Universe on large scales
is gravity, one is immediately led to consider a quantum theory of the whole
Universe – quantum cosmology [22]. Since the Universe naturally contains
all of its observers, the problem arises to come up with an interpretation of
quantum theory that contains no classical realms on the fundamental level.
How can a temporal dynamics be understood from the stationary equation
(6)? It has been demonstrated that a concept of time re-emerges in a semi-
classical limit as an approximate concept [22, 20]. In this limit, an effective
time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation holds along formal WKB trajectories.
Since different semiclassical branches usually decohere from one another, an
observer cannot experience the other branches which only together form the
one wave function Ψ in (6).
Clearly, the Copenhagen interpretation cannot cope with quantum cos-
mology. This is the reason why most people working in this field, at least
implicitly, adopt the Everett interpretation, since it is hard to imagine from
where a conceivable collapse could emerge. The problems that are addressed
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in quantum cosmology include the quantum origin of the Universe, the quan-
tum probability for the occurrence of an inflationary phase, and the quantum-
to-classical transition for primordial fluctuations which serve as the seeds for
structure formation in the Universe, giving rise to galaxies [22]. With the
advent of precision measurements for the spectrum of the cosmic microwave
background radiation, some of these questions gain observational significance.
It would thus be unsatisfactory to avoid a theoretical description of such pro-
cesses just because some pre-conceived interpretation of quantum theory does
not fit this purpose.
4 Conclusion
The Copenhagen interpetation needs classical concepts as prerequisites. On
the other hand, quantum theory itself predicts the occurrence of decoherence
through which systems such as measurement devices can appear classically
to local observers. This can be, and has been, interpreted as a quantum
justification for at least part of the original Copenhagen programme [19].
This explains, in retrospect, why the Copenhagen interpretations can serve
as a background for pragmatic calculations, at least in non-gravitational
situations.
The process of decoherence is based on the validity of the Schro¨dinger
equation and can thus not describe any real collapse. For local experiments,
this is definitely not needed, because decoherence can explain why we seem
to observe a collapse or a “quantum jump”. It would seem unnatural and
ad hoc to introduce a real collapse at this stage, where an apparent collapse
is predicted anyway by the Schro¨dinger equation. The concept of quantum
jumps thus plays the role of epicycles in astronomy [23] – it describes naively
what is observed, but it becomes redundant at the fundamental, theoretical,
level.
Still, the measurement problem is not resolved for the total system in-
cluding the environment. The only alternatives so far are to either assume
an additional real collapse in violation of the Schro¨dinger equation (for which
there is not yet any experimental hint), or to adopt an Everett interpreta-
tion with its simultaneous reality of all branches. It seems hard to imagine
that an experimental decision between these alternatives can be made in the
foreseeable future. However, it is important to keep an open mind and to
avoid the burden of a pre-imposed interpretation – “sonst wa¨re ernstlich zu
befu¨rchten, daß es dort, wo wir das Weiterfragen verbieten, wohl doch noch
einiges Wissenswerte zu fragen gibt” [24].3
3“Otherwise it would be seriously feared that just there, where we forbid further ques-
9
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